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Abstract
The paper analyzes the question why the U.S. economy in the 2000:4–
2004:3 period was sluggish in light of the large expansionary fiscal and monetary policies that took place. The answer does not appear to be that there
were large structural changes in the economy or systematic bad shocks. This
paper tests for such changes and shocks, and the results are generally negative. Instead, the main culprits seem to be large negative effects from declines
in the stock market and exports. Although not tested in this paper, some of
the decline in exports may be the result of the stock market decline, in which
case most of the explanation is simply the stock market decline itself.
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Introduction

The United States had in the 2000:4–2004:3 period large expansionary fiscal and
monetary policies and yet a recession and fairly slow recovery from the recession.
The sluggish economy in this period can be seen from Figures 1–3, which contain
plots for the 1985:1–2004:3 period. Figure 1 plots the log of real GDP; Figure 2
∗ Cowles
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Plots for 1985:1-2004:3
Figure 1
Log of Real GDP

Figure 2
Log of Employment
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Figure 3
The Unemployment Rate
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Figure 4
Four-Quarter Percentage Change in the GDP Deflator
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Figure 6
Ratio of Federal Corporate Profit Taxes to Corporate Profits

Figure 5
Ratio of Federal Personal Income Taxes to Taxable Income
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Plots for 1985:1-2004:3
Figure 8
Three-Month Treasury Bill Rate

Figure 7
Ratio of Real Federal Purchases of Goods to Potential Real Output
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Figure 9
Ratio of Federal Government Surplus to GDP
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Figure 10
Ratio of U.S. Current Account to GDP
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Figure 11
Ratio of Real Household Wealth to Potential Real Output
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Figure 12
Ratio of U.S. Real Exports to Potential Real Output
No Export Decrease
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Figure 13
U.S. S&P 500 Stock Price Index and German DAX Stock Price Index
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plots the log of the total number of jobs (called “employment”); and Figure 3
plots the unemployment rate.1 Figure 2 is striking in showing essentially no job
growth for the entire 2000:4–2004:3 period. Figure 4 shows that the inflation
rate has remained low during the 2000:4–2004:3 period: inflation has clearly not
been a problem. The expansionary fiscal and monetary policies can be seen from
Figures 5–8. Figure 5 plots the ratio of federal personal income taxes to taxable
income; Figure 6 plots the ratio of federal corporate profit taxes to corporate profits;
Figure 7 plots the ratio of real federal purchases of goods to a measure of potential
1 The

data are discussed in Section 2.
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real output;2 and Figure 8 plots the three-month Treasury bill rate. (Ignore for now
the dotted horizontal lines in Figures 5, 7, and 8—and in Figure 12 below.) Taxes
fell dramatically beginning in 2001, and federal spending as a share of output rose
fairly consistently from 2001:1 on. The Fed began lowering interest rates in 2001:1.
Finally, Figure 9 shows the movement of the federal government budget from large
surplus to large deficit in the period after 2000, and Figure 10 shows that the U.S.
current account deficit remained large after 2000. The period 2000:4–2004:3 will
be called the “post boom” period in this paper.
An interesting question is why with so much stimulus did the economy not
do better? This paper uses a structural multicountry macroeconometric model,
called the “MC” model, to try to answer this question. The MC model is briefly
outlined in Section 2. In Section 3 the estimated U.S. equations are tested for
structural change beginning in 2000:4. Did the U.S. economy change in structural
ways in the post boom period? The results in Section 3 suggest no. In Section 4
the post boom period is examined for possible bad shocks. Were there a series of
negative demand shocks that contributed to the sluggish economy? The estimated
residuals of the U.S. consumption and investment equations are examined for large
systematic values. There do not appear from this exercise to be systematically bad
shocks.3
2 The

measure of potential real output is discussed in Section 2. In Figure 7, and in Figures 11
and 12 below, the variables of interest have been divided by potential rather than actual real output
to avoid having the plots be influenced by cyclical fluctuations in actual real output.
3 The word “shocks” in this paper is not meant to refer to changes in stock prices and changes
in exports. As will be seen, these changes were large and negative in the post boom period. They
have been taken to be exogenous in this paper. Although these changes could be called shocks, for
ease of discussion, “shocks” has been limited to any exogenous changes other than stock-price and
export changes.
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Having ruled out structural change and bad shocks, what explanations are left?
One important characteristic of the post boom period was a large fall in stock
prices. The effect of the decrease in stock prices on U.S. household wealth can be
seen from Figure 11, where the ratio of real U.S. household wealth to potential real
output is plotted. There was a huge decrease in wealth beginning in the middle of
2000. Clearly, part of the sluggishness of the post boom period could be due to
negative wealth effects.
Another important characteristic of the post boom period was a sharp fall in
U.S. exports, which can be seen in Figure 12, where the ratio of U.S. real exports
to potential real output is plotted. It is interesting that the fall in exports began
almost exactly at the same time as the fall in stock prices. The fall in stock prices
that began in the middle of 2000 was a worldwide phenomenon. An example of
this is presented in Figure 13, where the U.S. S&P 500 stock price index is plotted
along with the German DAX stock price index. It is clear that there is a strong
positive correlation. The same is true of most other countries’ stock price indices.
It is thus possible that some of the decline in the demand for U.S. exports was due
to negative wealth effects on demand in other countries. More will be said about
this later.
Section 5 consists of a number of counterfactual experiments using the MC
model. The first three experiments provide estimates of the effects of the expansionary fiscal and monetary policies in the post boom period. The estimates are
briefly as follows. Had there been no tax cuts, employment would have been 2.2
percent lower by 2004:3 than it actually was; had there been no large increases
in federal purchases of goods, employment would have been 1.2 percent lower;
6

and had there been no fall in short-term interest rates, employment would have
been 2.5 percent lower. These effects are roughly additive in the model (fourth
experiment), and the combined estimate is that employment would have been 5.6
percent lower in 2004:3 than it actually was. Note from Figure 2 that what actually
took place in the post boom period was essentially no employment growth, and
so had there been no policy stimulus, it is estimated that employment would have
fallen by about 5.6 percent rather than remaining roughly unchanged. In the fourth
experiment the estimate is that the unemployment rate in 2004:3 would have been
2.9 percentage points higher than it actually was. The actual unemployment rate
in 2004:3 was 5.5 percent, and so had there been no policy stimulus, the estimate
is that the unemployment rate would have been 8.4 percent.
The fifth experiment in Section 5 provides an estimate of the size of the U.S.
wealth effect. Had there been no U.S. stock market decline, it is estimated that
employment by the end of the period would have been 1.4 percent higher than otherwise and the unemployment rate would have been 1.6 percentage points lower.
The sixth experiment provides an estimate of the effect of the decline in U.S. exports. Had U.S. exports not declined, it is estimated that employment by the end of
the period would have been 2.7 percent higher than otherwise and the unemployment rate would have been 1.2 percentage points lower.4 Again, these effects are
roughly additive (seventh experiment), and the combined estimate is that employment would have been 4.0 percent lower than otherwise and the unemployment
4As

discussed later, in the model wealth has a negative effect on labor supply, and so, other
things being equal, an increase in wealth decreases the labor force, which lowers the unemployment
rate. This is the reason the unemployment rate falls more in the stock market experiment than in
the export experiment even though employment rises more in the export experiment.
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rate would have been 2.6 percentage points lower.
These results thus suggest that much of the policy stimulus in the post boom
period was needed to offset the stock market and export effects. Focusing on
2004:3, where the actual unemployment rate was 5.5 percent, the estimate is that
it would have been 8.4 percent without the policy stimulus. However, had there
been no stimulus and no stock market and export decline, the estimate is that the
unemployment rate would have been 5.8 percent (8.4 minus 2.6), which is close
to the actual.
The results also suggest that some policy stimulus would have been needed
even with no stock market and export decline to keep the unemployment rate from
rising from its low of 3.9 percent in 2000:4. Figures 4–6 show that in 2000:3 the
ratio of federal personal income taxes to taxable income was fairly high, federal
government spending was fairly low, and the interest rate was fairly high. According to the model, even with no stock market and export decline, some change in at
least one of these policy variables would have been needed to avoid an increase in
the unemployment rate.

2 The MC Model
Overview
The latest discussion of the MC model is in Fair (2004b). There are 39 countries
in the MC model for which stochastic equations are estimated.5 There are 31
5 The

39 countries are the United States, Canada, Japan, Austria, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Finland, Australia, South Africa, Korea, Bel-
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stochastic equations for the United States and up to 15 each for the other countries.
In addition, there are about 1200 estimated trade share equations. Trade share data
were collected for 59 countries, and so the trade share matrix is 59 × 59.6
The estimation periods begin in 1954 for the United States and as soon after
1960 as data permit for the other countries. The estimation technique is two stage
least squares except when there are too few observations to make the technique
practical, where ordinary least squares is used. The estimation accounts for possible
serial correlation of the error terms. The variables used for the first stage regressors
for a country are the main predetermined variables in the model for the country.
The model is completely estimated; there is no calibration.
The exact model that is used for the results in this paper is on the website
listed in the introductory footnote. The specification of the U.S. part of the model,
called the US model, is exactly as in Fair (2004b). The only difference is that the
equations have been estimated through 2004:3 rather than 2002:3. A few minor
changes were made to the rest of the MC model, and the estimation periods were
extended whenever possible. The model can be used on the website, where all
the results in Section 5 can be replicated. The model can also be downloaded to
one’s own computer, and if this is done, all the coefficient estimates, including the
trade-share coefficient estimates, can be replicated.7
gium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia,
Venezuela, Colombia, Jordan, Syria, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, China,
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru.
6 The 20 other countries that fill out the trade share matrix are Turkey, Poland, Russia, Ukraine,
Egypt, Israel, Kenya, Bangladesh, Hong Kong, Singapore, Vietnam, Nigeria, Algeria, Indonesia,
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, and an all other category.
7All the data are downloaded with the model. In terms of the variables in the model and the
above figures, real GDP is GDP R, employment is J F + J G + J M + J S, the unemployment rate
is U R, the GDP deflator is GDP D, the ratio of federal personal income taxes to taxable income

9

The MC model has been extensively tested, including tests for rational expectations, and it appears to be a good approximation of the economy. These tests
and the general case for the model and the methodology used in its specification
is in Fair (2004b), and this discussion is not repeated here. The following is a
brief outline of the estimated equations of the US model, which are examined in
Sections 3 and 4.
The U.S. Stochastic Equations
The household-sector and firm-sector equations are specified under the assumption
that households maximize utility and firms maximize profits. The theory is used
to guide the choice of explanatory variables. Lagged dependent variables are
used to pick up expectational and lagged adjustment effects. The explanatory
variables in the four household expenditure equations (service, nondurable, and
durable consumption and housing investment) include after-tax income, lagged
wealth, and interest rates. They also include variables to pick up age distribution
effects. The consumer durables equation includes the lagged stock of durable
goods, and the housing investment equation includes the lagged stock of housing.
The explanatory variables in the four household labor supply equations (labor force
of males 25-54, females 25-54, all others 16+, and moonlighters) include the real
wage, a variable to pick up discouraged worker effects, and lagged wealth. As
is T H G/Y T , the ratio of federal corporate profit taxes to corporate taxes is D2G, the ratio of real
federal purchases of goods to potential real output is COG/Y S, the three-month Treasury bill rate
is RS, the ratio of the federal government surplus to GDP is SGP /GDP , the ratio of the U.S.
current account to GDP is −SR/GDP , the ratio of real household wealth to potential real output is
AA/Y S, and the ratio of U.S. real exports to potential real output is EX/Y S. The data for Figure
13 are monthly data and were taken from the Yahoo website.
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noted in the Introduction, wealth has a negative effect on labor supply.
The nonresidential fixed investment equation has two cost of capital variables.
One is an estimate of the real AAA bond rate, and the other is a function of stock
price changes. It is through the second variable that stock prices affect investment.
This equation also includes output variables. The explanatory variables in the
inventory investment equation include sales and the lagged stock of inventories.
The explanatory variables in the demand for workers and demand for hours per
worker equations include output and the amount of excess labor on hand. There
are price and wage equations, where the price equation includes as explanatory
variables the wage rate, the price of imports, and the unemployment rate, and the
wage equation includes the price level and a productivity term.
There is a demand for money equation for the household sector, one for the
firm sector, and a demand for currency equation. The explanatory variables in each
of these equations include a transaction variable and an interest rate. There is a
stock price equation where the value of capital gains or losses on stocks held by
the household sector depends on the change in earnings and the change in the bond
rate.
There is an estimated interest rate rule of the Fed, where the explanatory variables include the rate of inflation, the unemployment rate, and the lagged growth
of the money supply. The AAA bond rate and a mortgage rate are explained by
term structure equations, where the explanatory variables are current and lagged
values of the short term interest rate.
The demand for imports depends on a domestic activity variable and the ratio of
the domestic price level to the import price level. The remaining equations explain
11

overtime hours, dividends, interest payments of the firm sector, interest payments
of the federal government sector, inventory valuation adjustment, depreciation for
the firm sector, bank borrowing from the Fed, and unemployment benefits.
Some Properties of the Model
Some of the effects in the model that are relevant for the experiments in Section 5
are the following. All variables are U.S. variables unless otherwise stated. Also,
the following discussion focuses only on primary effects; there are many secondary
effects.
Personal income tax cuts increase disposable personal income, Y D, which is
an explanatory variable in the consumption and housing investment equations. Tax
cuts thus increase demand. There are no income distribution effects in the model:
Y D is increased by the amount of any tax decrease regardless of whose taxes are
decreased. This will be discussed further in Section 4. Personal income tax cuts
also increase the aggregate after-tax wage, which is an explanatory variable in the
labor supply equations. An increase in the after-tax wage increases labor supply.
An increase in government purchases of goods increases firms’ sales, which
leads to an increase in production and then employment and investment. This is a
straightforward increase in demand. The same is true for an increase in exports.
A fall in interest rates increases consumption and investment: interest rates
appear as explanatory variables in the consumption and investment equations. A
decrease in U.S. interest rates relative to other countries’ interest rates leads to a
depreciation of the dollar, which is expansionary in the United States through an
increase in exports and a decrease in imports.
12

An increase in stock prices increases household wealth and lowers firms’ cost
of capital. An increase in household wealth increases consumption since wealth
is an explanatory variable in the consumption equations. A fall in the cost of
capital increases plant and equipment investment since the cost of capital is an
explanatory variable in the plant and equipment investment equation. Also, as
noted in the Introduction, an increase in household wealth has a negative effect on
labor supply.
One other feature of the model that needs to be discussed is the effect on
the economy of a decrease in the federal corporate profit tax rate, denoted D2G,
which is plotted in Figure 6. When D2G falls, after-tax corporate profits increase,
which in turn in the model has a positive effect on dividends (and thus household
income) and stock prices (and thus household wealth). The increase in stock prices
also lowers the cost of capital, which has a positive effect on firms’ investment.
While these effects are, as expected, expansionary, they are initially quite small
in the model because the effects on both dividends and stock prices are small. A
decrease in D2G has very little short run effect on real GDP. The model thus
says that decreasing D2G is not an effective way to stimulate the economy; the
main effect is just an increase in the federal government deficit. The model may or
may not be a good approximation in this regard, but at least for present purposes it
makes experiments changing D2G uninteresting. Therefore, no D2G experiments
are performed. If one believes the model, the main effect of the fall of D2G in
Figure 6 in the post boom period was simply to increase the federal government
deficit.
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3

End-of-Sample Stability Tests

The first test in this paper is to see if there were structural changes in the post
boom period. The hypothesis tested is that the coefficients in each of the 30 U.S.
stochastic equations are the same both before and after 2000:4. The method in
Andrews (2003) is used for the tests. The exact version of the test used here is
discussed in Fair (2004b), pp. 11–12, and this discussion will not be repeated. The
method requires estimation over different subsets of the overall sample period.8
The test produces a p-value for each equation tested. A p-value of, say, less than
.05 is a rejection of the hypothesis of stability at the 95 percent confidence level.
The results for the 30 equations are presented in Table 1. There are five rejections of the hypothesis of stability at the 95 percent confidence level. The first,
and most important, is for durable consumption, equation 3. In 2001:4, the first
quarter after 9/11, there was a huge increase in durable consumption, due in large
part to the introduction of zero percent financing for cars, and, as will be seen in
the next section, the equation substantially underpredicted durable consumption
in this period. This was enough to lead to a rejection of the stability hypothesis.
More will be said about this in the next section.
8 Dummy

variables appear in a few of the U.S. stochastic equations. These variables take on a
value of 1.0 during certain quarters and 0.0 otherwise. For example, there are four dummy variables
in the U.S. import equation that are, respectively, 1.0 in 1969:1, 1969:2, 1971:4, and 1972:1 and 0.0
otherwise. These are meant to pick up effects of two dock strikes. A dummy variable coefficient
obviously cannot be estimated for sample periods in which the dummy variable is always zero.
This rules out the use of the end-of-sample test if some of the sample periods that are used in the test
have all zero values for at least one dummy variable. To get around this problem when performing
the test, all dummy variable coefficients were taken to be fixed and equal to their estimates based
on the entire sample period.
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Table 1
End of Sample Stability Test Results
for the 30 U.S. Equations
Eq.

Dependent Variable

p-value

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Service consumption
Nondurable consumption
Durable consumption
Housing investment
Labor force, men 25-54
Labor force, women 25-54
Labor force, all others 16+
Moonlighters
Demand for money, h
Price level
Inventory investment
Nonresidential fixed investment
Workers
Hours per worker
Overtime hours
Wage rate
Demand for money, f
Dividends
Interest payments, f
Inventory valuation adjustment
Depreciation, f
Bank borrowing from the Fed
AAA bond rate
Mortgage rate
Capital gains or losses
Demand for currency
Imports
Unemployment benefits
Interest payments, g
Fed interest rate rule

.948
.645
.000
.738
.645
.657
.750
.913
.017
.924
.866
.145
.628
1.000
.939
.826
.477
.140
.140
.087
.017
1.000
.227
.384
.023
.785
.709
.000
.384
.436

• h = household sector, f = firm sector, g = federal government sector.
• Overall sample period: 1954:1–2004:3 except
1956:1–2004:3 for equation 15.
• Break point tested: 2000:4.
• Estimation technique: 2SLS.
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Three of the other four rejections are for minor equations in the model: 9) the
demand for money of the household sector, 21) depreciation, and 28) unemployment benefits. The demand for money equations are not important in the model
because the short-term interest rate is determined by the Fed interest rate rule. The
depreciation and unemployment benefits rejections are due to legislative changes
not accounted for in the equations.
The other rejection is for equation 25, which explains capital gains or losses on
corporate stocks held by the household sector, denoted CG. In this equation CG
depends on the change in after-tax profits and the change in the bond rate, although
very little of the variance is explained. Not surprisingly, the change in stock prices
is essentially unpredictable. Neither of the explanatory variables in this equation
has values in the 1990s and early 2000s that would predict the huge increase in
stock prices in the last half of the 1990s and the huge decrease beginning in 2000.
For the experiments in Section 5, equation 25 has been dropped and CG has been
taken to be exogenous.
Overall, the results in Table 1 are strongly supportive of the view that there were
no major structural changes in the post boom period. The equations for which the
stability hypothesis is not rejected include all the aggregate demand equations
(consumption, investment, imports) except for the durable consumption equation,
the price and wage equations, the labor supply and labor demand equations, and
the estimated interest rate rule of the Fed.
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4

Examination of Residuals

If there were large negative demand shocks in the post boom period, one would
expect the estimated residuals from the demand equations to show this. This
is easy to examine by simply looking at the large residuals from the demand
equations. Table 2 presents these residuals for nine equations. For each equation
the residuals in the post boom period were divided by the estimated standard error
of the equation, and values greater than or equal to 0.75 in absolute value were
chosen for Table 2. A value in Table 2 is the actual value minus the predicted value
divided by the estimated standard error of the equation. For imports the sign is
reversed because a positive residual is a negative domestic demand shock. If no
number is presented, the ratio was less than 0.75 in absolute value.
If there were large negative demand shocks, Table 2 should show many negative
values for the first seven equations. This is not the case. The largest absolute value
is 4.7 percent for 2001:4 for durable consumption, which, as noted in the previous
section, is primarily the huge response to zero percent financing for cars, which is
not explained by the equation. So this shock is in the wrong direction. The worst
quarter for negative shocks is 2001:1, where the three values presented are negative
and the value for plant and equipment investment is large in absolute value at -3.3
percent. Otherwise, there are no systematic patterns. The next largest absolute
value is -2.3 percent for durable consumption in 2002:1. The last two columns
in Table 2 show values for the labor demand equation and the price equation, and
again there are no systematic patterns.
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Table 2
Large Absolute-Value Residuals
100(Actual - Predicted)/Standard Error
1
2000.4
2001.1
2001.2
2001.3
2001.4
2002.1
2002.2
2002.3
2002.4
2003.1
2003.2
2003.3
2003.4
2004.1
2004.2
2004.3

2

1.1

4

Equation
12
11

-1.4
-1.1
-0.9

-1.4
0.9
-1.0
-1.3
1.2
0.8
-1.0

3

1.1

-0.9
-1.6
4.7
-2.3

-1.7

0.8
-3.3
-1.0
0.9
-1.1
0.8
-0.8
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10
-1.2

-1.3
-1.0
-1.9

1.9
-1.4

-1.0
-1.1
-1.2

-1.0

0.9

1.2

1.6
0.9
-1.1
1.9
1.4

1.3
-1.1
1.0

1.0
-1.2

27

-1.0
-1.4
1.7

-1.0
-1.0

1.7
0.9

-1.2

-0.8

Equation 1: Service consumption
Equation 2: Nondurable consumption
Equation 3: Durable consumption
Equation 4: Housing investment
Equation 12: Nonresidential fixed investment
Equation 11: Inventory investment
Equation 27: −Imports
Equation 13: Workers
Equation 10: Price level

Table 2 thus says that conditional on the equations being good approximations,
the post boom period does not appear to be one of unusually large shocks except
for the positive shock to durable consumption in 2001:4. Shocks do not appear to
explain the sluggishness of the post boom period.
There is one further interesting point from Table 2. Remember that the income variable in the consumption and housing investment equations is aggregate
disposable income, Y D. This is an aggregate variable, and it is not affected by
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income distribution changes. There was much talk in the 2004 presidential election campaign and earlier about the ineffectiveness of the tax cuts passed during
the Bush administration because so much of the tax savings went to very high
income people. A test of this ineffectiveness hypothesis is to examine the residuals from the first four equations in Table 2. Under this hypothesis there should
be many negative residuals: the consumption and housing investment equations
should overpredict demand because they are treating all of the tax savings flowing into Y D the same. If the people receiving most of the tax savings spend less
of their income than others, then the equations, which treat all income the same,
should overpredict spending. Since Table 2 does not show a preponderance of
large negative residuals, the results do not support the ineffectiveness hypothesis.
This test, of course, relies only on aggregate data and may have low power, but the
results at least suggest that the income distribution effects on aggregate demand
from the tax cuts may be small.9

5

Counterfactual Experiments: 2000:4–2004:3

Seven experiments using the MC model are reported in this section. In each
experiment one or more exogenous variables are changed for the 2000:4–2004:3
period and the effects of these changes are analyzed. The experiments can be
duplicated on the website mentioned in the introductory footnote. The estimated
residuals are first added to all the stochastic equations. This means that when the
9 Note that this is just an argument about aggregate demand effects.

in favor of the particular tax legislation that was passed.
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In no way is it an argument

model is solved using the actual values of all the exogenous variables, a perfect
tracking solution is obtained. The actual values are thus the base values. Unless
otherwise noted, the variables discussed below are U.S. variables.
In the regular version of the model monetary policy is endogenous: the shortterm interest rate, RS, is determined by the estimated Fed interest rate rule, equation
30. For the experiments in this section, equation 30 is dropped. RS is taken to be
exogenous, and its values are either taken to be the actual values or particular values
chosen for the experiment. Similarly, the capital gains equation determining CG,
equation 25, is dropped. CG is taken to be exogenous, and its values are either
taken to be the actual values or particular values chosen for the experiment.
It should be stressed that the experiments in this section are meant to answer
“what if” questions. For example, the first experiment asks what would have
happened had personal income tax rates not been lowered and RS and CG not
been changed from their historical values. In practice, of course, had tax rates
been lowered the Fed would have behaved differently (by following equation 30
according to the model). Also, CG would have changed. But the interest here is
to examine effects conditional on RS and CG being exogenous.
The first experiment concerns personal income tax rates. Figure 5 plots the
ratio of federal personal income taxes to taxable income. In the model this ratio
is endogenous because the tax system is progressive. The exogenous tax-rate
variable in the model is denoted D1G. For the first experiment D1G was taken to
be unchanged from its actual value in 2000:3. In Figure 5 this is roughly equivalent
to taking the ratio to be the horizontal dotted line. After this change, the model is
solved. The difference between the solution value and the actual value for each
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endogenous variable for each quarter is the effect of the D1G change. The solution
values will be called values in the “no tax cuts” case.
Figure 14 plots results for six variables: the four-quarter percentage change in
real GDP, the log of employment, the unemployment rate, the four-quarter change
in the GDP deflator, the ratio of the federal government budget surplus to GDP, and
the ratio of the U.S. current account to GDP. Table 3 presents results for the last
quarter, 2004:3. In the no tax cuts case employment is 2.2 percent lower by 2004:3,
the unemployment rate is 1.0 percentage points higher, and the government budget
has improved by 2.6 percent of GDP.
For the second experiment real federal government purchases of goods was
taken to be 2.97 percent of potential real output, which is the actual percent in
2000:3. This case will be called the “no G increase” case.10 Figure 7 shows a plot
of this assumption. Figure 15 and Table 3 present results. In this case employment
is 1.2 percent lower by 2004:3, the unemployment rate is 0.6 percentage points
higher, and the government budget has improved by 0.4 percent of GDP.
For the third experiment the short-term interest rate, RS, was kept unchanged
from its 2000:3 value, as shown in Figure 8. In this case there is no easing by the
Fed; it will be called the “no RS decrease” case. Figure 16 and Table 3 present
results. In this case employment is 2.2 percent lower by 2004:3, the unemployment
rate is 1.1 percentage points higher, and the government budget has worsened by 1.6
percent of GDP. The government budget worsens because of lower tax revenue due
to the fall in taxable income and because of higher government interest payments
10 There

is, of course, some increase in government purchases of goods because potential output
is increasing.
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Table 3
Predicted minus Base for 2004:3
(percentage points)
Experiment
1.
2.
3.
4.

No Tax Cuts
No G Increase
No RS Decrease
1+2+3

5. 4 + no stock market fall
6. 4 + no export decrease
7. 5 + 6

Employment
-2.2
-1.2
-2.2
-5.6

-4.2
-2.9
-1.6

5 or 6 or 7
minus 4
1.4
2.7
4.0

Unemployment Rate

Fed. Gov. Surplus

1.0
0.6
1.1
2.9

2.6
0.4
-1.6
1.5

1.3
1.7
0.3

5 or 6 or 7
minus 4
-1.6
-1.2
-2.6

2.2
2.6
3.3

5 or 6 or 7
minus 4
0.7
1.1
1.8

due to the higher interest rates.
The fourth experiment is a combination of the first three. It will be called
the “no stimulus” case. Figure 17 and Table 3 present results. As noted in the
Introduction, the results across the first three experiments are roughly additive,
which can be seen in Table 3. In the no stimulus case employment is 5.6 percent
lower by 2004:3, the unemployment rate is 2.9 percentage points higher, and the
government budget has improved by 1.5 percent of GDP.
The results so far show the quantitative effects of the fiscal and monetary
policy stimulus. As would be expected from looking at the size of the changes in
the policy variables in Figures 5, 7, and 8, the quantitative effects on the economy
are estimated to be quite large. Had there been no stimulus the economy would
have been much worse.
The fifth experiment estimates the effects on the economy from the fall in
stock prices. So far CG, the capital gains or losses on financial assets held by the
household sector, has been taken to be exogenous. CG, which is from the U.S.
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Figure 14
Experiment 1: Plots for 2000:4-2004:3
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Figure 14d
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Figure 15
Experiment 2: Plots for 2000:4-2004:3
Figure 15a
Four-Quarter Growth Rate of Real GDP
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Figure 15c
The Unemployment Rate
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Figure 16
Experiment 3: Plots for 2000:4-2004:3
Figure 16a
Four-Quarter Growth Rate of Real GDP
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Figure 16d
Four-Quarter Percentage Change in the GDP Deflator
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Figure 17
Experiment 4: Plots for 2000:4-2004:3
Figure 17a
Four-Quarter Growth Rate of Real GDP
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Figure 17d
Four-Quarter Percentage Change in the GDP Deflator
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Flow of Funds Accounts, is a good measure of the effects of stock price changes on
the household sector. The sum of CG between 1995:1 and 2000:3, the period of the
stock market boom, was $13.557 trillion, an average of $589 billion per quarter.
Then between 2000:4 and 2002:3 the sum was −$6.958 trillion, an average of
−$870 billion per quarter. So more than half of the gain during the boom was lost
in this eight-quarter period. From 2002:4 on the stock market picked up, and the
sum of CG between 2002:4 and 2004:3 was $4.501 trillion, an average of $563
billion per quarter.
The ratio of CG to nominal GDP averaged 0.118 between 1954:1 and 1994:4.
Between 1980:1 and 1994:4 the average was essentially the same, 0.117. For the
fifth experiment the ratio of CG to nominal GDP was taken to be 0.118 in each
quarter between 2000:4 and 2004:3. In other words, the stock market from 2000:4
on was taken to behave as it had on average from 1994:4 back. In this experiment
there is no stock market “correction,” just historically average behavior going
forward.
The fifth experiment combines the CG changes and the no stimulus changes.
If only the CG changes were used (with policy taken as it actually happened),
the economy would be driven to values of the unemployment rate below historical
experience. Macroeconometric models like the MC model are not necessarily
reliable when pushed beyond the range of the historical data, and it is best to avoid
doing this whenever possible. In the present case this can be done by combining
the CG changes with the no stimulus changes.
Figure 18 and Table 3 present results for the fifth experiment. Table 3 shows
that in this case employment is 4.2 percent lower in 2004:3, which compares to
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Figure 18
Experiment 5: Plots for 2000:4-2004:3
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5.6 percent lower in experiment 4 using the actual stock market decrease. The
fall in the stock market is thus estimated to have led employment to be 1.4 (= 5.6
- 4.2) percent lower than otherwise. Also, the fall is estimated to have led the
unemployment rate to be 1.6 percentage points higher and the government budget
to worsen by 0.7 percent of GDP.
The sixth experiment estimates the effects on the economy from the fall in U.S.
exports. This experiment is more complicated to perform because U.S. exports,
EX, is endogenous. EX is determined by the other countries’ import demands for
U.S. goods and services, which are endogenous in the MC model. To perform this
experiment the import demands from Canada, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, and
the United Kingdom were taken to be exogenous and imports for these countries
were raised to correspond to an increase in EX such that the ratio of EX to potential
real output was equal to its value in 2000:3, as shown in Figure 12. In other words,
demand from these six countries was exogenously increased to correspond to the
desired increase in EX.
The sixth experiment combines the EX changes and the no stimulus changes.
Figure 19 and Table 3 present results. In this case employment is 2.9 percent lower
in 2004:3, which compares to 5.6 percent lower in experiment 4 using the actual
export values. The fall in exports is thus estimated to have led employment to
be 2.7 percent lower than otherwise. Also, the fall is estimated to have led the
unemployment rate to be 1.2 percentage points higher and the government budget
to worsen by 1.1 percent of GDP.
The seventh experiment is a combination of five and six. Figure 20 and Table
3 present results. Again, the results are roughly additive, which can be seen in
29

Figure 19
Experiment 6: Plots for 2000:4-2004:3
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Figure 20
Experiment 7: Plots for 2000:4-2004:3
Figure 20a
Four-Quarter Growth Rate of Real GDP
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Table 3. In this case of no stimulus, no decrease in the stock market, and no decrease
in exports, employment is 1.6 percent lower by 2004:3, the unemployment rate is
0.3 percentage points higher, and the government budget has improved by 3.3
percent of GDP.
A useful way to summarize the overall results is to compare Figures 17c and
20c. Figure 17c shows that had there been no policy stimulus the unemployment
rate would have risen to a little over 8 percent by 2003:2, whereas the actual rate
was about 6 percent. Figure 20c shows that had there been no policy stimulus
and also no stock market and export decline, the unemployment rate would have
only gradually risen and would have remained below the actual rate until the
last quarter, 2004:3. Some policy stimulus would have been needed to keep the
unemployment rate from rising, but much less than actually occurred. Figure 20e
is also interesting in showing that the federal government budget would have been
in surplus or roughly balanced over this period had there been no policy stimulus
and no stock market and export decline.

6

Conclusion

The answer in this paper to the question posed in the Introduction, namely why the
U.S. economy in the 2000:4–2004:3 period was fairly sluggish in light of the large
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, is that there were large negative effects
from the decline in the stock market and exports that needed to be offset. The
answer is not that there were large structural changes in the economy or systematic
bad shocks, since none were found. There is also no evidence that the tax cuts were
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less stimulative than they otherwise would have been because of after-tax income
distribution effects.
The analysis in this paper has taken the decline in the stock market and exports
to be exogenous. Whatever led to household wealth falling by $6.958 trillion
between 2000:4 and 2002:3 is not explained. The decline in U.S. exports is also
not explained. It is interesting, as noted in the Introduction, that the timing of
the decline in exports matches closely the timing of the stock market decline.
Between 2000:4 and 2002:1, U.S. exports of goods and services declined $120.4
billion in real terms (2000 dollars). Of this, $79.6 billion was in exports of capital
goods, except automotive, and $12.0 billion was in durable industrial supplies and
materials. The decline in travel (mostly foreign tourism in the United States) was
$15.8 billion. The events of 9/11 undoubtedly contributed to this decline in travel,
although travel was not the main source of the overall decline in exports. Much
of the overall decline would appear to be a decrease in capital investment abroad,
and this decrease could have been affected by the generally worldwide decline in
stock prices. If much of the decrease in capital investment was due to the decline
in stock prices, then the decline in stock prices is the main source of the sluggish
post boom period. In this case only the stock market decline need be considered
to be taken as exogenous.
The results in this paper are similar to those in Fair (2004a) except with the
opposite sign. In this earlier paper most of the unusual features of the U.S. economy
in the last half of the 1990s were attributed to the huge increase in stock prices.
(Remember from Section 5 that the increase in household wealth between 1995:1
and 2000:3 was $13.557 trillion.) In the present paper much of the unusual features
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of the economy in the first part of the 2000s are attributed to the huge decrease
in stock prices, especially if much of the export decline was a result of the stock
market decline.
The main point of these two papers is reflected in Figures 11 and 13. Had the
stock market from 1995 on grown at its historically average rate rather than the
actual rates in the figures, the MC model says that the economy would have been
much different. The wealth effects both going up and going down are estimated
to be quite large. No explanation is offered in these two papers as to why the
stock market boomed in the last half of the 1990s and fell substantially after that.
It seems highly unlikely that an econometrically estimated equation can be found
that explains much of this variance. With hindsight, however, it is interesting to
speculate whether monetary policy could have stopped the stock market boom in
the late 1990s. Although this paper and the earlier one have no answer to this
question because the stock market is not explained, the results do show that the
quantitative effects of not stopping the boom if it could have been stopped were
very large.
Finally, a note about the use of the MC model. A structural macroeconometric
model like the MC model is needed to perform the kinds of experiments in this
paper. VAR models are not detailed and structural enough. Calibrated models,
while structural in one sense, are not detailed enough regarding tax-rate, wealth,
and export effects to allow the present experiments to be performed. The MC
model is fully estimated, and it incorporates all the main macroeconomic links
among countries and within the United States. It is structural in that economic
theory has been used to guide the specification of the equations. The estimated
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equations are approximations of decision equations. Expectations are not taken to
be rational (model consistent) because there appears to be little empirical support
for the rational expectations hypothesis. Although the MC model has only been
briefly outlined in this paper, a complete discussion is in Fair (2004b) along with
many tests. From these tests the model appears to be a good approximation of the
economy, which adds support to the results in this paper. Although the model is
large, it is not a black box. The entire MC model can be downloaded, estimated,
and used to duplicate the experiments in this paper. The experiments can also be
duplicated on line without having to download and estimate the model.
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